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People may believe that personal attributes are fixed entities that
cannot be changed (hold an entity theory). Alternatively, they
may believe that qualities of a person are malleable (hold an
incremental theory). In the present research, the authors used
Sternberg’s (1966) memory search task to examine entity and
incremental theorists’ cognitive strategies in memory search. It
was hypothesized that entity theorists, who have a greater ten-
dency to make spontaneous evaluation of people, would orga-
nize impressions in short-term memory according to whether the
stimulus persons are positively or negatively evaluated. Next,
they might compare the probe only to the stimulus persons with
matched valence or discard the ones that did not match the probe
in valence. By comparison, incremental theorists, who tend not
to make immediate evaluative trait judgments, should be less
likely to use these evaluation-based strategies. These hypotheses
were confirmed in two memory search experiments, in which the
names of positive or negative persons were used as stimuli.
There is considerable evidence that lay theories about
human attributes structure the way people understand
and react to human actions and outcomes (see Dweck,
Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Some people may believe that an
individual’s personal attributes are fixed, unchangeable
entities, that is, they subscribe to an entity theory of per-
sonal attributes. Others may conceive of personal char-
acteristics as malleable qualities that can be developed,
that is, they hold an incremental theory of personal
attributes. These beliefs may function as background
assumptions and set up an interpretive framework that
gives meaning to incoming information (Dweck et al.,
1995; Jones & Thibaut, 1958; Wegner & Vallacher, 1977).
Consistent with this idea, research has shown that lay the-
ories could influence interpersonal perception (Chiu,
Hong, & Dweck, 1997), social decision making (Gervey,
Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1999), intergroup perception
(Hong, Chiu, Yeung, & Tong, 1999; Hong, Levy, & Chiu,
2001; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998), moral reasoning
(Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997), and reactions to aca-
demic failures and social rejections (e.g., Hong, Chiu,
Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999).
In the domain of person cognition, past research has
shown that entity theorists, who believe in fixed personal
traits, tend to diagnose traits from behavioral informa-
tion (Dweck et al., 1995). Because evaluation is an inte-
gral part of trait diagnosis (see Tesser & Martin, 1996, for
review), compared to incremental theorists, entity theo-
rists may process person information in a more
evaluative manner. Consistent with this idea, a series of
studies by Hong, Chiu, Dweck, and Sacks (1997) found
that compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists
are more likely to attach evaluative meaning to informa-
tion about a person and form a global evaluative impres-
sion of the person. In the present research, we sought to
extend this work by examining how evaluation affects
entity and incremental theorists’ processing strategies in
memory search. If entity theorists are more likely than
incremental theorists to represent impressions of others
in terms of global, evaluative traits (Chiu, Hong, &
Dweck, 1997; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993), do they also
have a greater tendency than incremental theorists to
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use evaluation to organize impressions of multiple indi-
viduals in memory search?
In one study, Chiu (1994) provided participants with
explicit trait and goal information about nine target per-
sons and had the participants rate the similarity and dis-
similarity of various target persons. The results showed
that entity theorists used evaluative traits (intelligence
and morality) as the primary basis for judging similarity
and thus as the basis for organizing their impressions of
the target persons. In contrast, incremental theorists
used goals as the major basis for judging people as simi-
lar. These findings provided evidence for the idea that
entity theorists rely more heavily on evaluative informa-
tion than do incremental theorists in organizing impres-
sions of people. Thus, it seems possible that entity and
incremental theorists may differ in how they perform
cognitive operations on impressions of others.
THE MEMORY SEARCH TASK
We proposed that compared to incremental theorists,
entity theorists are more ready to use evaluative informa-
tion to perform cognitive operations on impressions. In
the present research, we adopted the memory search
task developed by Sternberg (1966) to test this idea. In a
memory search task, the participant memorizes a list of
stimuli (memory set) and judges whether a target pre-
sented at the end (probe) is a member of the memory
set. According to Sternberg’s (1969) multistage model
of information processing, when the stimuli enter short-
term memory, participants will prepare the information
for memory search by encoding the information into a
certain representational format. Researchers can create
a linear reaction time function by regressing search time
on set size. When this is done, the zero intercept in the
reaction time function would reflect the constant
amount of time needed for stimulus encoding. Next, to
complete the memory search, the participants would
engage in serial comparison. At this stage, search time
should increase linearly with set size, and the slope of the
reaction time function should reflect the speed of serial
comparison (Sternberg, 1966).
In Experiment 1, names of people in each partici-
pant’s social circle were collected and used in the mem-
ory search task as stimuli. On each trial, a memory set of
two to six names was presented. Half of the stimulus per-
sons were positively evaluated and half negatively evalu-
ated by the participant. The participant’s task was to
judge whether the target name (the probe) presented at
the end of each trial was in the memory set.
In the information encoding stage, participants could
encode the stimuli persons in terms of their valence. We
believe that evaluative encoding of the stimulus persons
could result in clustering of stimulus persons by valence.
Participants in this experiment could then use at least
two evaluation-based strategies to complete the memory
search: (a) segregation and selective search and (b)
elimination of stimulus persons with mismatched
valence. Note that the stimulus persons were either posi-
tively or negatively evaluated acquaintances of the partic-
ipants. Participants who used the segregation and selec-
tive search strategy would first separate the positive
stimulus persons from the negative ones. When they
needed to determine whether a particular target was in
the memory set, they could selectively access either the
positive cluster or the negative cluster (but not both)
depending on the valence of the target. For example,
when they needed to determine whether a positively
evaluated target was in the memory set, they would scan
the stimulus persons in the positive cluster only. Because
half of the stimulus persons were in the positive cluster
and half were in the negative cluster, the number of stim-
ulus persons they needed to search before making the
judgment would be half of the set size. With fewer items
to search, the amount of time they needed to complete
the search should be smaller.
Participants who used the elimination of stimulus per-
sons with mismatched valence strategy also could sort
the stimulus persons in the memory set by their valence
and then use the valence of the probe to reduce the size
of the memory set. For example, when the probe was a
negatively evaluated person, they would discard the posi-
tively evaluated persons in the memory set and reduce
the size of memory set. This strategy also would reduce
the amount of time required to complete the memory
search.
We predicted that although evaluation-based strate-
gies are available to both entity and incremental theo-
rists in memory search, entity theorists are more likely
than incremental theorists to employ these strategies.
On one hand, compared to incremental theorists, entity
theorists rely more heavily on evaluation to categorize
people (Chiu, 1994). On the other hand, incremental
theorists are more likely than entity theorists to consider
other dimensions when they categorize individuals. For
example, in the Chiu (1994) study, incremental theorists
tended to categorize people on the basis of more specific
mediating factors such as the actor’s goals or motivation.
Because organization of impressions by evaluation is a
precondition for using the two evaluation-based search
strategies, we predicted that entity theorists would be
more prepared than incremental theorists to use these
strategies and hence be more able to save time in mem-
ory search.
In Experiment 1, the stimulus persons were real
acquaintances from the participants’ social circles.
Using stimulus persons that the participants had known
for a while helps to protect the external validity of the
study. However, this procedure also leaves open a few
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alternative explanations of the findings. For example,
the stimulus persons generated by entity and incremen-
tal theorists might differ in evaluative extremity. In addi-
tion, the stimulus persons generated by the two groups
also might differ in the amount of familiarity with the
participants. To address this problem, we had taken cau-
tion to minimize the threats of these confounds to the
experiment’s internal validity. We also attempted to rep-
licate the findings of Experiment 1 in another study that
used fictitious names as stimulus persons. Specifically, in
Experiment 2, participants were first trained to attach
evaluative meaning to 32 fictitious names, which were
later used in a memory search task. In both Experiments
1 and 2, we predicted that compared to incremental the-
orists, entity theorists, who are likely to use evaluation-
based strategies, would need shorter time to complete
the memory search.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
OVERVIEW
The stimuli in the memory search task were names of
eight positively and eight negatively evaluated persons.
On each trial, the participant listened to a sequence of
two to six names, saw a visual probe (target name) on the
screen, and indicated whether the target name was in the
memory set. We hypothesized that relative to incremen-
tal theorists, entity theorists would show a smaller
increase in response time as the size of the memory set
increased.
PARTICIPANTS
The participants were 41 (10 men, 31 women; average
age = 20.8) undergraduates from a local university in
Hong Kong. They participated to receive course require-
ment credits.
LAY THEORIES MEASURE
The lay theories of the participants were measured
using a questionnaire developed by Dweck and her col-
leagues (Dweck et al., 1995).
Lay theories are domain-specific beliefs (Dweck et al.,
1995). Individuals who hold an entity theory of intelli-
gence may hold an incremental theory of moral charac-
ter. Moreover, it is the lay theory in a particular domain
that affects judgments and reactions in that domain.
Although we did not collect information on how the par-
ticipants formed evaluative judgments of the target per-
sons, past research has shown that intelligence and
moral character are the two dominant dimensions that
perceivers use to form impressions of others (Wegner &
Vallacher, 1977). Chiu (1994) also found intelligence
and morality to be the two major trait dimensions entity
theorists use to categorize impressions of others. Thus,
in the present experiment, we assessed the participants’
lay theories of intelligence and moral character.
The items in the lay theory of intelligence measure
are as follows: “You have a certain amount of intelligence
and you really can’t do much to change it,” “Your intelli-
gence is something about you that you can’t change very
much,” and “You can learn new things but you can’t
really change your basic intelligence.” The items in the
lay theory of moral character measure are as follows: “A
person’s moral character is something very basic about
them and it can’t be changed much,” “Whether a person
is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in
their personality. It cannot be changed very much,” and
“There is not much that can be done to change a per-
son’s moral traits (e.g., conscientiousness, uprightness,
and honesty)” (Dweck et al., 1995). Respondents indi-
cated their agreement with each of the items on a 6-point
scale that ranged from 1 (very strongly agree) to 6 (very
strongly disagree). Their responses to the three items were
averaged to form a measure of lay theory for each
domain, with a higher score on the measure indicating a
stronger belief in an incremental theory.
In past research (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Hong,
Chiu, Dweck, et al., 1999; Levy et al., 1998), participants
who agreed with an entity theory and those who dis-
agreed with it (or those who agreed with an incremental
theory) often displayed distinct patterns of social infer-
ences and reactions. In addition, when participants were
experimentally led to believe in an entity or incremental
theory, their responses looked very much the same as
those who agreed or disagreed with the entity theory
items. These findings have led some researchers to
believe that entity and incremental theorists are two dis-
tinct worldviews (as opposed to two ends of a belief con-
tinuum) (Dweck et al., 1995). Therefore, we classified
participants who scored below 3.5 (the theoretical mid-
point of the scale) on the lay theory measures as entity
theorists and those who scored above 3.5 as incremental
theorists. Using this criterion, 14 and 27 participants
were classified as entity and incremental theorists of
intelligence, respectively. In the domain of moral char-
acter, 18 were classified as entity theorists and 23 as incre-
mental theorists. The correlation between the two lay
theory measures was significant (r = .46, p < .05). Nine
and 18 participants were entity and incremental theo-
rists in both domains, respectively.1
Dweck et al. (1995) have reported extensive informa-
tion attesting to the reliability and validity of the mea-
sures. Very briefly, test-retest reliability for a 2-week inter-
val is .80 for both the intelligence theory measure and
the moral character theory measure. The internal reli-
ability of the intelligence theory measure ranged from
.94 to .98, and that of the moral character theory mea-
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sure ranged from .85 to .94 (Dweck et al., 1995). Con-
cerning the validity of the measure, past research has
found the moral character measure to be predictive of
the respondents’ moral and justice beliefs (Chiu, Dweck,
et al., 1997) and the tendency to make moral trait infer-
ences from behavior in a theoretically meaningful man-
ner (see Dweck et al., 1993). The intelligence theory
measure also has been found to be predictive of theoreti-
cally relevant judgments and reactions in the achievement
domain (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, et al., 1999). With respect
to discriminant validity, the lay theory measures do not
correlate with standard measures of self-presentation
concerns (see Snyder’s [1974] Self-Monitoring Scale),
socially desirable responding (see Paulhus’s [1984]
Social Desirability Scale), intellectual abilities (Scholas-
tic Aptitude Test scores), self-esteem (Coopersmith,
1967), and political attitudes (Kerlinger, 1984; see also
Dweck et al., 1995; Levy et al., 1998).
GENERATION OF NAMES OF
STIMULUS PERSONS FOR
THE MEMORY SEARCH TASK
Participants attended the first session of the experi-
ment in small groups. They first filled out the lay theories
measures. Next, they wrote down the names of 30 real
acquaintances from their social circles. They were asked
to name 15 people they liked and 15 people they dis-
liked. Participants in some groups named the 15 disliked
persons first and the remaining participants named the
15 liked persons first. Next, the participants rated how
good or bad was their impression of the people they had
named on a 5-point scale, from 1 (slightly positive/nega-
tive) to 5 (very positive/negative).
For each participant, we selected eight persons who
received the most positive evaluations and eight who
received the most negative evaluations as the stimulus
persons in the memory search task. The names of the
selected stimulus persons were recorded in a female
voice and digitized for computerized auditory presenta-
tion. Table 1 shows that in both domains (intelligence
and morality) and for both positive and negative stimu-
lus persons, the stimulus persons generated by entity and
incremental theorists did not differ in evaluative extrem-
ity (ts ranged from –1.42 to –.52). At the end of the mem-
ory search task, we asked the participants to report their
relationship with the 16 stimulus persons. Two inde-
pendent coders who were blind to the participants’ lay
theories coded the reported relationships into 17 rela-
tionship categories: immediate family member, relatives,
grade school classmates, high school classmates, univer-
sity classmates, coworker in the same university student
society, ex-coworker in the same university student soci-
ety, member of the same voluntary group, resident in the
same student dormitory, teacher, student, colleague or
ex-colleague, spouse, friend, neighbor, ex-boyfriend or
ex-girlfriend, and indirect relationship. Intercoder
agreement was 99.7%, and disagreements were resolved
through group discussion.
For each domain (intelligence and morality), we com-
pared entity and incremental theorists’ likelihood of
having a stimulus person in each of the 17 relationship
categories. Of the 34 comparisons summarized in Table 2,
only 3 reached the .05 level of significance. Independent
of the participants’ lay theories, grade school classmates,
university classmates, residents in their own student dor-
mitory, and friends were most likely to be selected as the
stimulus persons.
THE MEMORY SEARCH TASK
Two weeks after the first session, the participant took
part in the memory search task. We used a Macintosh
computer and the software Power Laboratory to control
the presentation of the stimuli and to record the partici-
pant’s responses.
In the memory search task, there were 80 trials, which
were randomly distributed into four blocks of 20 trials
each. Each block consisted of four trials of each set size
(2, 3, 4, 5, or 6). The order of presentation of the four
blocks was counterbalanced using a Latin Square design.
On each trial, we presented the names of two to six
stimulus persons, half of which were positive stimulus
persons. The remaining ones were negative stimulus
persons. When set size equaled three, one positive and
two negative stimulus persons were presented in half of
the trials and two positive and one negative stimulus per-
sons were presented in the remaining trials. Similarly,
when set size equaled five, two positive and three nega-
tive stimulus persons were presented in half of the trials
and three positive and two negative stimulus persons
were presented in the remaining trials. The presentation
order of the stimulus persons within each trial was
randomized.
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TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of the Evaluative Ratings of the Positive and Negative Stimulus Persons
Intelligence Theory Moral Character Theory
Entity Incremental t Ratio Entity Incremental t Ratio
Mean valence rating of the eight positive stimulus persons 4.48 (.35) 4.42 (.46) –.63 4.48 (.44) 4.41 (.38) –.52
Mean valence rating of the eight negative stimulus persons 3.83 (.85) 3.56 (.73) –1.04 3.85 (.83) 3.51 (.71) –1.42
As in Sternberg (1966), we presented each name in
the memory set for 2 sec. One second after the presenta-
tion of all the names in the memory set, the word end
appeared for 1 sec. Next, the participant saw the probe
and judged whether it was on the memory list. The
probes were positively evaluated targets in half of the tri-
als and negatively evaluated targets in the remaining tri-
als. The participant responded by pressing the appropri-
ate key on the keyboard as accurately and quickly as
possible. In half of the trials (the “yes” trials), the probe
was in the memory set. In the remaining trials (the “no”
trials), the probe was not in the set. The participant’s
responses (“yes” or “no”) and reaction times were
recorded.
The participants first completed several practice trials
before they proceeded to the task. Feedback on the cor-
rectness of the responses was given during the practice
trials. On the experimental trials, the participants did
not receive any feedback.
It was important that the participants attended to the
full name of the stimulus persons so that the evaluative
association of the names could be activated. If the names
were presented visually on the screen, participants could
attend to the family name or the last name only. Thus, we
presented the names of the stimulus persons auditorily.
In the first two blocks of trials, the answer key for “yes”
and “no” was “c” and “m,” respectively. The answer keys
were reversed after the participants had finished the first
two blocks of trials. The participants went through
another series of practice trials before they proceeded to
the last two blocks of trials.
We conducted a postexperiment interview with the
participants. None of the participants reported any
knowledge of the research hypotheses.
Results
We eliminated reaction time outliners (6.7% of all
responses) by excluding reaction times that were 3 stan-
dard deviations above the mean reaction time. Before
the outliners were eliminated, mean reaction time =
1224.61 msec, Mdn = 1081 msec, SD= 652.65 msec, and
skewness = 5.87. After the outliners were eliminated,
mean reaction time = 1169.27 msec, Mdn = 1074 msec,
SD = 454.36 msec, and skewness was reduced to 1.48.
Reaction times for incorrect responses (1.7%) were
excluded from further analysis.
According to Sternberg (1969), in a short-term mem-
ory search task, participants would engage in an exhaus-
tive serial search, that is, they would compare the probe
to all the memorized items. Thus, for both “yes” and “no”
trials, search time should be proportional to the set size.
When search time is regressed on set size, the intercept
reflects the constant amount of time needed for stimulus
encoding, whereas the slope reflects the additional
amount of time needed for serial comparison with a unit
increase in the size of the memory set. To assess whether
participants performed an exhaustive serial search in
our memory search task, for each participant, we com-
puted the average reaction time of correct responses for
each of the five set sizes. Then, for each set size, we col-
lapsed the reaction times across participants to yield the
average reaction time for each set size. The resulting five
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TABLE 2: Distribution of the Selected Stimulus Persons in the 17 Relationship Categories
Intelligence Theory Morality Theory
Relationship Category Entity Incremental t Ratio Entity Incremental t Ratio
Immediate family member 0.64 0.93 .84 0.44 1.13 2.24*
Relative 1.00 0.93 –.15 1.11 0.83 –.59
Grade school classmate 4.07 5.41 1.33 4.72 5.13 .42
High school classmate 0.29 0.81 1.14 0.78 0.52 –.57
University classmate 2.93 1.37 –2.44* 2.00 1.83 –.27
Coworker in the same university student society 0.71 1.07 .64 0.89 1.00 .21
Ex-coworker in the same student society 0.00 0.37 2.44* 0.22 0.26 .25
Member of the same voluntary group 0.00 0.15 1.52 0.17 0.04 –1.32
Resident in the same student dormitory 2.57 1.44 –1.08 2.50 1.30 –1.21
Teacher 0.07 0.07 .03 0.00 0.13 1.21
Student 0.57 0.44 –.47 0.67 0.35 –1.26
Colleague/ex-colleague 0.14 0.04 –.93 0.11 0.04 –.62
Spouse 0.21 0.37 .83 0.22 0.39 .95
Friend 1.50 1.41 –.15 1.17 1.65 .82
Neighbor 0.43 0.70 .55 0.44 0.74 .62
Ex-boyfriend/ex-girlfriend 0.00 0.11 .72 0.00 0.13 .88
Indirect relationship (e.g., sister’s boyfriend,
roommate’s teacher) 0.43 0.26 –.50 0.28 0.35 .22
*p < .05.
reaction times were regressed on set size. The slope of
the regression line (76.6 msec) was significant, F(1, 3) =
132.4, p < .05, indicating that average search time
increased with set size. The same analysis performed on
the “yes” trials and the “no” trials yielded the same result:
The slope of the regression line was 85.9 msec for the
“yes” trials, F(1, 3) = 179.30, p < .05, and 68.0 msec for the
“no” trials, F(1, 3) = 88.50, p < .05. In short, the data pro-
vided clear evidence that participants had used an
exhaustive serial search strategy.
If participants adopted one or both evaluation-based
strategies in memory search, they should be able to com-
plete the memory search more quickly. Specifically, they
needed to scan through one item only when set size
equaled two, two items only when set size equaled four,
and three items only when set size equaled six. Thus, if
we regressed the average reaction time for each set size
on set size, the slopes of the regression lines should be
flatter among those who used the evaluation-based strat-
egies than among those who scanned all the stimulus
persons in the memory set. According to this line of rea-
soning, a critical test of our hypotheses was whether
entity theorists had flatter regression slopes than did
incremental theorists. Thus, for each participant, we
regressed their memory search time on set size and
obtained the intercept and slope of the regression line.
Although this analytic strategy may seem novel in social
cognition research, it has been widely used in memory
search experiments. As Sternberg (1969) put it,
An effect of stimulus degradation on the stimulus-encoding
stage, which generates the stimulus representation,
would increase the zero-intercept of the RT-function. An
effect on the serial-comparison stage would increase the
slope, since a time increment would be added for each
item compared. (p. 433)
Entity theorists and incremental theorists did not dif-
fer in the intercept, F(1, 39) = 2.64 for lay theory of intel-
ligence, and F(1, 39) = 1.30 for lay theory of moral char-
acter. A similar result was found for the “yes” trials, F(1,
39) = 1.96 for lay theory of intelligence, F(1, 39) = 0.01
for lay theory of moral character, and for the “no” trials,
F(1, 39) = 2.04 for lay theory of intelligence, F(1, 39) =
3.98 for lay theory of moral character. Thus, entity and
incremental theorists did not differ in the amount of time
they needed to complete the stimulus encoding stage.2
Table 3 shows the mean of the slopes of the regression
lines as a function of (a) entity versus incremental theory
of intelligence and (b) entity versus incremental theory
of moral character. The slope was significantly steeper
for incremental than for entity theorists of intelligence,
F(1, 39) = 8.96, p < .05. In other words, compared to
incremental theorists, entity theorists needed less time
to complete the memory search when set size increased. A
similar trend was found for lay theory of moral character,
although the difference was not significant, F(1, 39) =
3.15, p = .08.
We performed the same analyses on the “yes” and
“no” trials. For the “yes” trials, entity theorists of intelli-
gence had flatter regression slopes than did incremental
theorists of intelligence, F(1, 39) = 4.70, p < .05 (M =
67.90 msec and 95.22 msec for entity and incremental
theorists, respectively). However, the difference
between entity and incremental theorists of morality was
not significant, F(1, 39) = 0.40, ns. For the “no” trials,
entity theorists had significantly flatter slopes than did
incremental theorists in both the intelligence domain,
F(1, 39) = 5.52, p < .05 (M = 44.70 msec and 80.10 msec
for entity and incremental theorists, respectively) and
the moral character domain, F(1, 39) = 4.70, p < .05 (M =
50.40 msec and 81.90 msec for entity and incremental
theorists, respectively). In short, consistent with our hy-
pothesis, entity theorists seemed to have used evaluation-
based strategies to speed up the serial comparison pro-
cess in memory search.
Discussion
When the stimulus persons were participants’ liked or
disliked acquaintances, entity theorists needed less time
than did incremental theorists to complete the serial
comparison process in memory search. This finding is in
line with the idea that entity theorists are more likely
than incremental theorists to sort impressions into posi-
tive and negative clusters. This categorization strategy
allows entity theorists to selectively access only those
names that match the probe’s valence or to discard
names that do not match the probe’s valence. As a result,
the time they need to complete the serial comparison
process would be shortened.
In Experiment 1, we used real people in the partici-
pants’ social circles as stimulus persons. Although the
stimulus persons generated by entity and incremental
theorists had a similar level of evaluative extremity and
did not differ discernibly in the kinds of relationships
they had with the participants, this procedure did leave
open the question of whether the stimulus persons gen-
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TABLE 3: Mean Slope of the Regression Line as a Function of Lay
Theories
Lay Theory of Intelligence
Lay Theory of Entity Incremental Marginal
Moral Character Theorists Theorists Mean
Entity theorists 56.21 75.76 66.0
Incremental theorists 55.65 92.96 84.9
Marginal mean 56.0 87.2
erated by the different lay theory groups were equivalent
on all relevant dimensions. In addition, because the
stimulus persons were the participants’ acquaintances,
the participants had other nonevaluative information
about these stimulus persons. Thus, it could be argued
that entity theorists did not use evaluation-based strate-
gies. Instead, incremental theorists might try to retrieve
other relevant information about the stimulus persons
and used evaluation as well as other dimensions to cate-
gorize the stimulus persons. This relatively complex
strategy could make incremental theorists slower in
memory search. Another less interesting but nonethe-
less relevant alternative explanation is that incremental
theorists have a generalized tendency to respond slowly
in a memory search task.
To eliminate these alternative explanations, we con-
ducted two other experiments. In Experiment 2a, partic-
ipants were led to form positive or negative impressions
of some fictitious stimulus persons. Next, these novel
stimulus persons were used in a memory search task.
Thus, the stimulus persons should be equally familiar or
unfamiliar to entity and incremental theorists. More-
over, because only evaluative information about the stim-
ulus persons was available, incremental theorists could
not use other information to encode the stimulus per-
sons. If entity theorists were still speedier than incremen-
tal theorists in serial comparison, it would suggest that
entity theorists are more likely than incremental theo-
rists to employ evaluation-based strategies in memory
search. In Experiment 2b, the stimulus persons were
names of fictitious people that did not carry any
evaluative meaning. If incremental theorists are gener-
ally slower than entity theorists in memory search, they
should have steeper regression slopes than do entity the-
orists even when the stimulus persons have no evaluative
meaning.
EXPERIMENT 2A
Method
PARTICIPANTS
The participants were 45 (21 men, 24 women; average
age = 18.7) undergraduates who did not take part in
Experiment 1. They participated to receive course
requirement credits.
IMPRESSION FORMATION TASK
Participants were presented with information about
32 novel stimulus persons on a computer screen. We told
the participants that we had collected sample behaviors
of 32 individuals. On each trial, they would see and hear
the name of one of these individuals and a behavior this
individual had performed. Their task was to form an
impression of the individual based on the behavioral
description. The behaviors used in the present experi-
ment were found in a pretest (N = 160) to be highly
socially desirable or undesirable. The 16 negative behav-
iors selected in the present experiment had a mean rat-
ing of 2.94 (range = 1.50 to 4.32) on a 10-point scale (1 =
very negative, 10 = very positive), and the 16 positive behav-
iors had a mean rating of 8.27 (range = 6.57 to 9.21).
Examples of the behavioral descriptions are as follows:
“He invites new colleagues to his house for dinner”
(desirable behavior) and “ He blocks the fire exit with his
old furniture” (undesirable behavior). The behavioral
descriptions contained minimal information about the
context of the behavior.
To facilitate memory of the impressions, we organized
the stimulus persons into eight groups. Each group had
four stimulus persons with the same surname. Four
groups of stimulus persons had performed positive
behaviors, and the remaining groups had performed
negative behaviors. The participants used a 10-point
scale (1 = very negative and 10 = very positive) to rate their
impression of each stimulus person as well as their
impression of each of the eight groups. They did the rat-
ings after they had read the description of each stimulus
person and after they had read the descriptions of the
stimulus persons in each group. The mean rating of the
16 positive stimulus persons was 6.87 (SD = .81) and that
of the negative ones was 3.47 (SD = .60). The mean rating
of the four positive groups was 6.87 (SD = .93) and that of
the four negative groups was 3.43 (SD = .73).
LAY THEORY MEASURE
As noted, lay theories are domain specific. Given the
nature of the impression formation task, the relevant
domain in this experiment was personality. Thus, the
participants filled out the lay theory of personality mea-
sure before they performed the memory search task.
The lay theory of personality measure had the same for-
mat as the other lay theory measures. The items of this
measure are as follows: “The kind of person someone is is
something very basic about them and it can’t be changed
very much,” “People can do things differently but the
important parts of who they are can’t really be changed,”
and “Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not
much that can be done to really change that.” Using the
theoretical midpoint of 3.5 as the cutoff point, 23 partici-
pants were classified as entity theorists and 22 were classi-
fied as incremental theorists.
Recall that the participants rated their impressions of
the stimulus persons during the impression formation
session. The two lay theory groups did not differ in their
impressions of the stimulus persons (t = –.09 for the posi-
tive stimulus persons and t = –.81 for the negative stimu-
lus persons) or in those of the eight groups (t = –.14 for
the positive groups and t = –.07 for the negative groups).
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MEMORY SEARCH TASK
After the participants had completed the impression
formation session, they went through the memory
search task. The design and procedures of the memory
search task were identical to those used in Experiment 1,
with the exception that the stimulus persons in the pres-
ent experiment were the fictitious persons that appeared
in the impression formation session. To ensure that par-
ticipants did not use the stimulus persons’ surnames to
categorize the names in the memory set, the memory set
in each trial never contained more than one stimulus
person with the same surname.
Results and Discussion
Reaction time outliners (those larger than mean plus
3 standard deviations, 1.67% of the correct responses)
were excluded from further analysis. Before we elimi-
nated the reaction time outliners, mean reaction time
was 1359.65 msec, Mdn = 1186 msec, SD = 665.82 msec,
and skewness = 2.63. When the outliners were elimi-
nated, mean reaction time was 1307.11 msec, Mdn =
1178 msec, SD = 520.20 msec, and skewness was reduced
to 1.27. Incorrect responses (11.02%) also were
excluded.
The results replicated those found in Experiment 1.
Participants generally took more time to complete the
memory search when set size increased; the slope of the
regression line was 104.77 msec, F(1, 3) = 36.03, p < .05.
Entity and incremental theorists did not differ in the
intercept of the regression function, F(1, 43) = .11, ns. As
predicted, incremental theorists (M = 118.61, SD =
41.28) had a significantly steeper regression slope than
did entity theorists (M = 93.49, SD = 39.01), F(1, 43) =
4.41, p < .05.
In summary, despite that the fictitious stimulus per-
sons were equally unfamiliar to entity and incremental
theorists, entity theorists still needed less time to com-
plete the memory search than did incremental theorists.
In the present study, only evaluative information was
available for encoding the stimulus persons. It is unlikely
that incremental theorists had used other information
to encode the stimulus persons. Thus, incremental theo-
rists were slower than entity theorists in memory search
probably because they, unlike entity theorists, did not
use evaluation-based strategies. However, before we con-
clude that this is indeed the case, we need to establish
that incremental theorists do not have a generalized ten-
dency to respond slowly in memory search.
EXPERIMENT 2B
To assess whether incremental theorists have a gener-
alized tendency to be slower than entity theorists in
memory search, we had another 50 undergraduates (8
men, 48 women, average age = 19.9) fill out the lay the-
ory of personality measure and take part in a memory
search task. In this experiment, the stimuli were 28 novel
names made up by common family names and
nonvalenced given names.
We adopted the same criteria used in Experiments 1
and 2a to exclude reaction time outliners (2.85%).
Before the outliners were eliminated, mean reaction
time = 1519.30 msec, Mdn = 1302 msec, SD = 842.69 msec,
and skewness = 5.51. When outliners were excluded,
mean reaction time was 1447.63 msec, Mdn = 1294 msec,
SD = 585.62 msec, and skewness was reduced to 1.51. We
also excluded incorrect responses (7.23%) from further
analysis.
Again, participants generally took more time to com-
plete the memory search when set size increased; the
slope of the regression line (119.27 msec) was signifi-
cant, F(1, 3) = 71.61, p < .05. However, the intercepts, F(1,
48) = .02, and the slopes, F(1, 48) = .02, of the entity and
incremental theorists’ regression lines did not differ sig-
nificantly, suggesting that incremental theorists did not
have a generalized tendency to respond slowly in a mem-
ory search task. When the stimulus names did not carry
any evaluative meaning, entity and incremental theorists
were equally slow in memory search (M slope = 96.03, SD =
72.52 for entity theorists; M slope = 71.34, SD = 40.11 for
incremental theorists).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Experiments 1 and 2a showed that entity theorists
were more likely than incremental theorists to use
evaluation-based strategies when they performed a
memory search, both when the stimulus persons were
real individuals (Experiment 1) and when they were fic-
titious people (Experiment 2a). Such evaluation-based
strategies require grouping of the stimulus persons in
the search list by their valence. Once the stimulus per-
sons were sorted into separate clusters, entity theorists
might selectively access the stimulus persons who had
the same valence as the probe or exclude the stimulus
persons who did not match the probe in valence. Both
strategies could reduce the number of comparisons
required to complete the search. Because memory
search is a serial comparison process (Sternberg, 1966),
fewer comparisons would result in faster responses. In
both Experiments 1 and 2a, entity theorists were speed-
ier in memory search than incremental theorists. How-
ever, it is unclear from the present research which of the
two evaluation-based strategies entity theorists had used,
and this is an interesting topic for future research.
None of the participants in the experiment reported
in the postexperimental interview that they had used
evaluation to cluster the stimulus persons. Apparently,
this process took place without the participants’ con-
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scious awareness. As Wegner and Vallacher (1977) put it,
“Since (lay theories) are used again and again in almost
every interpersonal setting, our notions about others
become nearly reflexive in nature, in much the same way
that repeated motor skills become reflexive” (p. 16).
Previous research (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Hong
et al., 1997) has shown that incremental theorists were
less likely than entity theorists to form evaluative impres-
sions of people based on limited behavioral information.
One might argue that incremental theorists were less
likely to use evaluation-based strategies because they did
not attach evaluative meaning to the stimulus persons.
However, in Experiment 1, the stimulus persons gener-
ated by entity and incremental theorists did not differ in
evaluative extremity. In Experiment 2a, entity and incre-
mental theorists had formed equally extreme evaluative
impressions of the stimulus persons. It appears that
although incremental theorists might form evaluative
impressions of others as entity theorists do, they do not
spontaneously use evaluation-based strategies in mem-
ory search.
However, our findings do not imply that incremental
theorists do not categorize people into any mental struc-
tures. On the contrary, incremental theorists appear to
have a greater tendency to categorize others on the basis
of relatively dynamic behavioral mediators (e.g., goals)
(Chiu, 1994). It is possible that when goals are available
for organizing impressions in a memory search task,
incremental theorists may be more ready than entity the-
orists to use goal-based strategies in memory search. This
possibility merits future investigations.
Finally, it is worth noting that entity and incremental
theorists do not differ in their performance on standard-
ized tests of conceptual ability (e.g., the Academic Prom-
ise Tests) (Bennett et al., 1965) or tests of academic apti-
tude (SAT scores) or in their self-perceived intellectual
ability (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck et al., 1995).
In other words, incremental theorists are not more
cognitively competent and hence have a higher ability to
deal with social information in a complex way than are
entity theorists. In addition, in Experiment 2b, when the
stimulus persons had no evaluative meaning to the par-
ticipants, entity and incremental theorists did not differ
in their performance on the memory search task. In
other words, the results from Experiments 1 and 2a do
not reflect generalized differences between entity and
incremental theorists in their cognitive abilities.
In short, the present research showed that entity and
incremental theorists may organize impressions differ-
ently. Relative to incremental theorists, entity theorists
may have a greater spontaneous tendency to organize
positive and negative impressions into different clusters
(see also Hong et al., 1997). Such differences in categori-
zation strategies between entity and incremental theo-
rists are consistent with the previous findings that entity
theorists are relatively sensitive to the evaluative implica-
tions of behavioral and outcome information about the
self and others (Dweck, 1999). The present research also
showed that entity theorists’ sensitivity to evaluation
could have nontrivial consequences on the organization
and retrieval of person information in short-term
memory.
NOTES
1. The overall pattern of the results did not change when we treated
the implicit theory measures as continuous variables.
2. However, it is worth noting that regression lines with steeper (flat-
ter) slopes have a lower (higher) projected intercept (set size = 0) even
when both lines have the same reaction time at set size = 2.
REFERENCES
Bennett, F. K., Bennett, M. G., Glendenen, D. M., Deppelt, J. E., Ricks,
J. H., Jr., Seashore, H. G., & Wesman, A. G. (1965). Academic promise
tests. New York: Psychological Corporation.
Chiu, C. (1994). Bases of categorization: The role of implicit theories in per-
son cognition. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia
University.
Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., Tong, J. Y., & Fu, J. H. (1997). Implicit theories
and conceptions of morality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 73, 923-940.
Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1997). Lay dispositionism and
implicit theories of personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 73, 19-30.
Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self-esteem. San Francisco:
Freeman.
Dweck, C. S. (1999). Self-theories: Their role in motivation, personality, and
development. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995). Implicit theories and their
role in judgments and reactions: A world from two perspectives.
Psychological Inquiry, 6, 267-285.
Dweck, C. S., Hong, Y., & Chiu, C. (1993). Implicit theories: Individ-
ual differences in the likelihood and meaning of dispositional
inference [Special issue: On inferring personal dispositions from
behavior]. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 644-656.
Gervey, B. M., Chiu, C., Hong, Y., & Dweck, C. S. (1999). Differential
use of person information in decisions about guilt vs. innocence:
The role of implicit theories. Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-
tin, 25, 17-27.
Hong, Y., Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., Lin, D.M.-S. & Wan, W. (1999).
Implicit theories, attributions, and coping: A meaning system
approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 588-599.
Hong, Y., Chiu, C., Dweck, C. S., & Sacks, R. (1997). Implicit theories
and evaluative processes in person cognition. Journal of Experimen-
tal Social Psychology, 33, 296-323.
Hong, Y., Chiu, C., Yeung, G. & Tong, Y. (1999). Social comparison
during political transition: Interaction of entity versus incremen-
tal beliefs and social identities. International Journal of Intercultural
Relations, 23, 257-280.
Hong, Y., Levy, S. R., & Chiu, C. (2001). The contribution of the lay
theories approach to the study of groups. Personality and Social Psy-
chology Review, 5, 98-106.
Jones, E. E., & Thibaut, J. W. (1958). Interaction goals as bases of
inference in interpersonal perception. In R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo
(Eds.), Person perception and interpersonal behavior (pp. 151-178).
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kerlinger, F. N. (1984). Liberalism and conservatism: The nature and
structure of social attitudes. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Levy, S. R., Stroessner, S. J., & Dweck, C. S. (1998). Stereotype forma-
tion and endorsement: The role of implicit theories. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 74, 1421-1436.
1526 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Paulhus, D. L. (1984). Two-component models of socially desirable
responding. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 598-609.
Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 526-537.
Sternberg, S. (1966). High-speed scanning in human memory. Sci-
ence, 153, 652-654.
Sternberg, S. (1969). Memory-scanning: Mental processes revealed
by reaction-time experiments. American Scientist, 57, 421-457.
Tesser, A., & Martin, L. (1996) The psychology of evaluation. In E. T.
Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of
basic principles (pp. 400-432). New York: Guilford.
Wegner, D. M., & Vallacher, R. R. (1977). Implicit psychology: An intro-
duction to social cognition. New York: Oxford University Press.
Received November 26, 2001
Revision accepted April 21, 2002
Tong, Chiu / LAY THEORIES AND ORGANIZATION OF IMPRESSIONS 1527
